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NOTES
Extension of the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel
Into Bargained-for Transactions
In a written agreement, White promised to obtain or to furnish a
loan for Wheeler to finance the construction of a shopping center on
Wheeler's land. In return, Wheeler promised White $5,000 for his
services, plus a five per cent commission on all rentals obtained by
him (White). As to the loan, however, the agreement failed to pro-
vide the amount of monthly installments, the amount of interest due
upon the obligation, the matter in which the interest would be com-
puted, and the time when the interest would be paid. After the
agreement had been signed by both parties, White assured Wheeler
that the money would be available and urged him to demolish the
buildings on the site so that it would be ready for the contemplated
construction. Wheeler demolished his buildings, and when White
failed to secure or furnish the loan, Wheeler brought a suit for dam-
ages for breach of contract. The court of civil appeals1 affirmed the
judgment of the trial court, which found that the contract was too
indefinite to be enforced' and that White was not estopped from
asserting such insufficiency. Held, reversed and remanded: The doc-
trine of promissory estoppel can be used to establish a valid and en-
forceable contract where one of the promises is too indefinite to serve
as consideration for the return promise. Wheeler v. White, 398
S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965).
I. BASIC ELEMENTS OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts' sets out the doctrine of
promissory estoppel: "A promise which the promisor should reason-
ably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and sub-
stantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise." The doctrine provides a realistic
three-part test, consisting of the following elements: (1) promise,
(2) action-in-reliance, and (3) avoidance of injustice-all of which
must be present to make the promise enforceable.4
' Wheeler v. White, 385 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), rev'd, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex,
1965).
'The amount of installments and interest and the manner in which the interest would be
computed and the time when it would be paid were not specified.
aRESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
4 Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA.
L. REV. 459 (1950).
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To establish the first element, it must be determined whether the
words involved constitute a promise and whether that promise is of
such a nature that the promisor should reasonably expect it to induce
some action or forbearance by the promisee. The second element
prescribes a limitation on the promisor's responsibility: that the
promise most have induced or brought about action or forbearance
of a definite and substantial character by the promisee. Thirdly, the
promisee must demonstrate the injustice he will suffer if the promise
is not enforced; the hardship to him must be evident so that the doc-
trine will not be loosely applied.
In Wheeler, the court had no difficulty finding the latter two ele-
ments, action-in-reliance and the avoidance of injustice. White's con-
tinued assurances and his urging Wheeler to proceed (as contem-
plated by the agreement) with the necessary task of demolishing the
buildings then on the site speak for themselves as to Wheeler's reli-
ance. Moreover, demolishing buildings worth $58,500 and with a
rental value of $400 per month was action of a definite and sub-
stantial character. The court properly found that the only way to
avoid injustice was to sustain Wheeler's cause of action upon the
theory of promissory estoppel; otherwise, Wheeler would have had
no remedy. He would have lost the value and use of his destroyed
buildings plus the expectation of the income that the new buildings
would have produced. The importance of the decision lies in the fact
that the court found that the promise, although too indefinite to
serve as consideration, was the type of promise to which promissory
estoppel could be applied.
II. GRATUITOUS PROMISE OR BARGAINED-FOR PROMISE
Traditionally, the doctrine of promissory estoppel has been invoked
as a substitute for consideration, rendering a gratuitous promise en-
forceable as a contract. In the Restatement, for example, it is part
'See Beale, Gratuitous Undertakings, 5 HARV. L. REV. 222 (1891); Boyer, Promissory
Estoppel: Principle From Precedents, 50 MicH. L. REV. 639 (pt. I), 873 (pt. II) (1952);
Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARv. L. REv. 913(1951). The doctrine of promissory estoppel grew out of at least five different fact situa-
tions: (1) charitable subscriptions, where the subscriber was not actuated by a desire to ob-
tain an equivalent in exchange. Thompson v. McAllen Federated Woman's Bldg. Corp., 273
S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error dism.; Rouff v. Washington & Lee Univ., 48
S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error ref.; (2) parol promises to give land, where the
promissor did not seek anything in return for his promise. Greiner v. Greiner, 131 Kan.
760, 293 P. 759 (1930); (3) gratuitous bailments, Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909,
92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1703); (4) gratuitous agency, RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY §378 (1958); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Holman, 330 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1964); Maddock v.
Riggs, 106 Kan. 808, 190 P. 12 (1920); and (5) a miscellany including gratuitous promises
to give bonuses and pensions, Ricketts v. Scothern, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (1898);
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of a topic entitled Informal Contracts Without Assent or Considera-
tion.6 The intention of the drafters was to recognize certain instances
where promises would be enforced despite the absence of considera-
tion.' This prevailing attitude tended to exclude the context of bar-
gaining and exchange, where consideration existed but was insuffi-
cient.8
In Texas, before Wheeler, the use of promissory estoppel in bar-
gained-for transactions had been limited to enforcing gratuitous
promises collateral to a valid contract.! Even Goodman v. Dicker,"0
the District of Columbia case relied on by the court in Wheeler,
while dealing with a business transaction, did not involve a bargained-
for exchange or an attempted one. The defendant, an agent for the
Emerson Radio Co. had promised that a franchise would be granted
the plaintiff. With the knowledge and encouragement of the defend-
ant, the plaintiff had incurred various expenses in preparing to do
business under the franchise. The court concluded that the defend-
ant could not advance any defense inconsistent with his assurance that
the franchise would be granted. But in Goodman, although the de-
fendant probably would have profited under the franchise, there was
no bargained-for exchange for the franchise.
III. THE EXTENSION OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
In Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.," a Wisconsin case decided just
prior to Wheeler and one which the Texas court did not mention,
the defendant agreed to build a store for the plaintiff to operate. In
return, the plaintiff was to invest $18,000. After the plaintiff had
waiver, Trexler's Estate, 27 Pa. A. & C. 4 (1936); Rancher v. Franks, 269 S.W.2d 926
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Richards v. Frick-Reid Supply Corp., 160 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1942) error ref. w. m.; Longbotham v. Tey, 47 S.W.2d 1109 (Tex. Civ. App.
1932) error ref.; Ross v. Issaacs, 54 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error dism.; and
rent reductions, Fried v. Fisher, 328 Pa. 497, 196 A. 39 (1938).
0 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 85-94 (1932).
7 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, commentaries § 88 [§ 90] (tentative draft No. 2, 1926)
. . but the cases in question are not cases of bargains; they are gratuitous promises on
which justifiable reliance has been placed."
'James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
"See Hicks v. Smith, 330 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref. n.r.e., where,
in the making of a new or modified contract, the plaintiff had yielded his probable right of
forbearance to perform under the original contract. See also Evers v. Arnold, 210 S.W.2d
270 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948), where the defendant had agreed orally to procure a loan for
the plaintiffs so that they could purchase at cash price certain real estate from the de-
fendant. In reliance upon this promise, the plaintiffs entered into a written contract
for the purchase of the real estate and deposited earnest money, which was forfeited when
defendant failed to procure the loan. The court held, without reference to promissory
estoppel but with reference to the reliance and injury of the plaintiffs, that there was suffi-
cient consideration for the oral promise.
'o 169 F.2d 684 (1948).
" 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 NW.2d 267 (1965).
[Vol. 20
relied on the defendant's representations,'2 the defendant refused to
carry out its part of the agreement."3 The question facing the court
was whether the promise could be enforced by applying the doctrine
of promissory estoppel even though no agreement was reached on the
essential elements necessary to establish a contract. 4 The court stated:
If promissory estoppel were to be limited to only those situations where
the promise giving rise to the cause of action must be so definite with
respect to all details that a contract would result were the promise
supported by consideration, then the defendant's instant promises to
Hoffman would not meet the test. However, Sec. 90 of the Restate-
ment, 1 Contracts, does not impose the requirement that the promise
giving rise to the cause of action must be so comprehensive in scope
as to meet the requirement of an offer that would ripen into a contract
if accepted by the promisee."
The court concluded that injustice would result if the plaintiff were
not granted some relief.
In Hoffman, as in Wheeler, clearly there was a bargain and ex-
change of "adequate" consideration, that is, a substantial obligation
incurred by each party. Hoffman was to supply the capital and run
the store; Wheeler was to pay White $5,000 plus five per cent interest
on rentals acquired by him and was eventually to pay back the loan
with interest. The problem in each case was that the promise which
was to be the consideration was indefinite. The doctrine of promissory
estoppel was used to prevent the defendants in both cases from attack-
ing such possible "insufficiency" of the consideration. The courts in
both Wheeler and Hoffman refused to limit promissory estoppel to the
traditional gratuitous promise situations where there is, of course, no
intent to strike a bargain. In doing so, the courts extended promissory
estoppel beyond the boundaries intended by the drafters of the Re-
statement1 .
It must be noted that the court in Wheeler never mentioned that
it was extending the doctrine of promissory estoppel into bargained-
for situations. The court only stated that while many of the early
Texas cases on promissory estoppel dealt with charitable subscription
transactions or with waivers of pleading the statute of frauds,' it
a" Plaintiff bought a small grocery store in order to gain experience, and, later, this busi-
ness and a bakery that he had operated prior to negotiations were sold on defendant's advice.
He then moved his family to the proposed city for the new store and purchased an option
on a building site.
13 Negotiations were ended when plaintiff refused to accept defendant's final proposal
asking for a $34,000 investment.
14 These included size, cost, design and layout of the store building and the terms of
the lease with respect to rent, maintenance, renewal and purchase options.
"Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267, 275 (1965).
'6 See note 7 sipra and accompanying text.
17 See note 5 supra.
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was readily apparent that the equities involved in those situations
were applicable to the instant case.
The court was a bit more explicit in liberalizing the type of prom-
ise to which the doctrine could be applied. In Murphy v. Stell,5' an
early case decided before the development of promissory estoppel, the
Texas Supreme Court had stated that the terms and conditions of a
promise must be free from all ambiguity and doubt before a con-
tract can be enforced. Moreover, even after the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel had been developed, one leading case had held that the
doctrine could not be used to enforce a promise that was indefinite."
Professor Corbin had stated, "An 'illusory promise' [e.g., an indefinite
promise] is not turned into a promise by action in reliance, and the
rule stated in sec. 90 [of the Restatement of Contracts] has no appli-
cation."2 In Wheeler the court disregarded these authorities and con-
cluded that promissory estoppel could properly be used to establish
a contract where one of the promises was too indefinite to serve as
consideration for the return promise.
It is also interesting to note that the court made a definite choice as
to the measure of damages. It concluded that the promisee (Wheeler)
could recover no more than reliance damages measured by the detri-
ment sustained, i.e., the loss he actually suffered. 1 This conclusion
was based on two reasons: (1) promissory estoppel acts only de-
fensively so as to prevent an attack upon the enforceability of the
"843 Tex. 123 (1875). See also Johnson v. Breckenridge-Stephens Title Co., 257 S.W.
223 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924). The court stated that where the defendants entered into
an agreement to pay on a percentage basis for the use of the plaintiff's abstract indexes,
but did not agree to use these indexes or make any specified number of abstracts, they were
charged with the knowledge of the law that their contract was a nudum pactnm for the
essential lack of consideration (since they did not agree to use the indexes). Moreover, where
they purchased equipment at a substantial expense, the purchase was a mere hazard which
they took on the assumption that the plaintiff would continue to allow them the privilege
of using the indexes without exercising its right to terminate the agreement.
'9 Spooner v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 47 Wash. 2d 454, 287 P.2d 735 (1955). The court
said that before § 90 of the Restatement of Contracts could be applied there must be a real
promise to be enforced. Action in reliance upon a supposed promise (e.g., an indefinite
promise) creates no obligation on an individual or corporation whose only promise is wholly
illusory.
2o1A CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 201 (1963).
" Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises: A New Writ, 35 MIcH. L. REV. 908 (1937). Shattuck
contended that this measure adequately compensates the promisee, but does not unduly
penalize the promisor where no contract has been formed. Cf. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 1338 (rev. ed. 1937). Williston contended that while reliance on a promise may be a
reason for enforcing a promise, the measure of recovery must normally be the value of
the promised performance. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS § 90, comment
at 170 (tentative draft No. 2, 1965) "A promise binding under this section is a contract, and
full-scale enforcement by normal remedies is often appropriate. But the same factors which
bear on whether any relief should be granted also bear on the character and extent of the
remedy. In particular, relief may sometimes be limited to restitution or to damages or spe-




contract; and (2) the promisee is partially responsible for the failure
to bind the promisor to a legally sufficient contract. By this reason-
ing, the court concluded that justice is achieved by putting the
promisee in the position he would have been in had he not acted in
reliance upon the promise.
IV. CONCLUSION
Wheeler v. White is important because it broadens the application
of promissory estoppel. One noted writer concluded an article on
promissory estoppel with the following words:
Obvious also is the compartmentalization which has existed in the ap-
plication of the doctrine. So long as it is applied only when the fact
situation fits a preconceived pattern, such as a gratuitous promise to give
land, or a gratuitous bailment, its possibilities will not be completely
utilized. The restraints of compartmentalization must be overcome if
the courts are to recognize that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is
one of universal application.
In effect, the Texas Supreme Court took a major step towards realiz-
ing the full potential of the doctrine. This full potential is limited
only by the court's narrow choice of damages. If the purpose of the
doctrine is to enforce the promise (and thereby the contract), then
the measure of damages should normally be the value of the prom-
ised performance."
Even though the doctrine of promissory estoppel was originally
created to enforce gratuitous promises where there was no bargained-
for exchange and where consideration was completely lacking, the
doctrine should be extended to all situations where the requisites are
met. Under any circumstances it is unjust to allow a promissor, who
has aroused the expectations of a promisee and induced him to act or
to forbear from acting, to withdraw from the promise.
Steve Alan Ungerman
22 Because of the limited scope of this Note, the measure of damages cannot be adequate-
ly analyzed. For further references see: Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (pt. 1), 373 (pt. II) (1937); Note, 59 DicK. L. REV. 163
(1954); Note 13 VAND. L. REV. 705 (1960).
'aBoyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle From Precedents: 1, 50 MIcH. L. REV. 639, 674
(1952).
24See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
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